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COMMENT ON MONROE BEARDSLEY'S 
" INEVITABILITY IN H I STORY" 
by 
Leonard Krieger 
As a practising historian I must pay tribute to Beardsley's true feeling for the 
problems which historians face and for the characteristic responses they make to 
these problems. Not only does this feeling make Beardsley's particular contribution 
relevant to students of history but it also implies a general philosophical respect for 
history as a domain of knowledge which is the necessary condition for any dialogu,e 
between philosophers and his£orians. It is the deprecation of historical knowledge, 
indeed. introduced into the philosophical tradition by Aristotle and renewed 
periodically by such as Descartes and Nietzsche, that has inhibited this dialogue 
and thereby postponed progress in the discussion of the crucial questions in the 
philosophy of history, such as the question of inevitability. 
But precisely because the discussion is at an early stage. Beardsley's paper raises, 
in my mind at least. one primitive question which he does not raise but which must 
be raised if we are to understand lhe meaning of arguments like his. The question is 
this: -;ince. as Beardsley's very title clearly implies, there are inevitabilities outside 
of ac; well as in history, what is the relationship between the extra-historical·and the 
historical inevitability? Until th.is distinction is made explicit, we cannot know 
whether Bt>ard<;ley is testing a general model of inevitability on history. using 
inevitability in history as a promising arena for the development of a general model 
which is being frustrated in its other employments, or working out a concept of 
historical inevitability that is sui generis. I infer - ah hough I cannot know, because 
Beardsley has not told us - that be is writing in the second of these frameworks 
(applying to history a general model that has been hitherto undemonstrable 
elsewhere). ror clearly his crucial notion of an IS-generalization has nothing to do 
with time and is designed to be applicable far beyond history, and just as clearly its 
actual application to the category of inevitability outside of history has been 
problematical, since. as Beardsley himself says: "The problem of distinguishing 
between accidental and nooaccidental statements (between 'AU A's are B's and AH 
A's must be B's') awaits final solution, and this is no time to try to cope with it." But 
this is precisely the problem that he is coping with for history : what he maintains is 
that the relation between the "system of universal generalizations" and the non­
accidental universal statement which only "derives in some way" from it in general 
'iomchow becomes a more definite relation in the particular atmosphere of history. 
Be:irdsley should, in short. make much clearer than he does. that he is forcing 
history. traditionally the most dubious of logical arenas. to bear a burden of 
problem-solving that, according to his own testimony, other philosophical arenas 
ha' c not yet been able lo bear. 
The initial failure to specify the relationship between general and historical 
inevitability lies behind the circularity of Beardsley's argument for historical 
inevitability as such. H e  makes the "narrative bridge", which he carefully shows to 
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he incompauble \\ith ine' irabilily-statementi. m its paradigmatic htStoncal usage 
'>mce ll " com po ed of evitable hnks, pro' ide the materials for (admittedly loose) 
'Y'tem\ of generalizations which then ca11 be read back into other narrati\·e chains 
'' ith the imputation of inevitability. But 'iince the analogies and the psychological 
gcnerali1utions from these narrative bridges '' hich supply the support for IS­
genl!rali1ations require a classification into common categorie� which is far more 
que\tiona ble in history than in other fields. and since we are not shown. even 
granted the classification, ho\\ these analogies and generaliiations become the 
'\y<;tcm'' of generalizations which is Beard ley's casual but crucial medium of 
ine, itability, it is not clear how the Matcmcnts lifted out of historical processes 
acquire their non-accidental function unles'i they are assumed in these processes to 
begin with. l n  short, unless some magic is attributed to narration which turns its 
accidental links into non-accidental materials or generalirntion, statements lifted 
out of hi.-.1orical time have a more unreliable base and a no more reliable function 
for inev1tability than any statement whatsoc,•er on the model of all A's are B's. 
When hic..rorians question the \'Cry possibility of gcneraliwtion from history, 
Beardslc} '-; unexplained escalation or uch generaliwtion into a system of 
gcneral11a11on is almost as doubtful a.s is the policy of escalation in his historical 
illustration of the Vietnam War. 
There seems to be an assumption that the concept of ine\1lability as it may be 
applied to all human events is the same as historical inevitability. I wish to question 
that as.-;umption, and I think most or my colleagues in the field of history also would 
qut:stion it, although perhaps in a more radical way than I. The assumption is that 
concepts of possibility and ine,itability operate (or should operate) for the 
historian in the same way as they appear to do in other areas. I should like to ask 
whether t here is not a distinctive historical context for inevitability, t o  which 
general notions of inevitability must be adapted. 
Most historians seem to operate on the assumption that the universe is 
plu1 alistic: that is, they have the notion that their historical realm is an autonomous 
one, that they operate as historians within a world where all philosophical 
a\sumptions and questions are either suspended or so radically transformed as to 
c<mstitutc new species. Consequently, some historians are apt to say that possibility 
am.I ine' it<tbility are concepts that do not apply to history. Others may admit that 
the concepts apply. but still insist that their application ic; entirely different from the 
wa;r in which such concepts would be used outside of an historical setting. 
My own poc;ition is that the philosophical question-; and a-;sumplions concerning 
po,sihi lity and ine,irability to apply to the writing of history. but that there are 
distinctively historical forms of it which command more consensus among 
historians than the general logical model which Beardsley claims historians use on 
tht! hi .. tork<tl process. The first. and most ob,ious kind of such intra·historicaJ 
i1h!,itah1lity, if I may so call it. comes not from the H1Storian at all but solely from 
the historical agent - it comes. that i-,, from an e' cot's occurnng because an 
hiswrical agent belie,ed its occurrence 10 be ine,itable. Let us take. as an example, 
the c�c or the outbreak or the Se,en Years' War in 1756. The outbreak was oc­
cas1onetl by the Prussian Frederick the Grcat's iO\asion of Saxony. Frederick 
tn' adcd Saxony in 1756 because he wac; cominced that a coalition of Austria, 
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Russia and France was going 10 invade Prussia in 1757. And because h e  was 
con' inced that this coming was was ine,itable, he made the war inevitable. In this 
ense. '' hether historians pronounce historical events inevitable or not depends on 
whc1her they find men in their history believing an event 10 be inevitable and acting 
on that belief. For the hiscorian, this is second-hand ine,�tability. 
But 1here is another kind o( intra-historical ine,1itability that is, perhaps, of more 
interest 10 philosophers. This is what we may call an inevitable inevitability which 
comec; solely from the historian and has nothing to do with the character of 
historical agents or events. For the historian, every event chat has happened, 
bccau!.e it has actually happened, becomes inevitable 10 him as an hi.rtorian. When 
an his1orian looks back at an e"ent and seeks to explain it, he must atart and end 
with this event and no other. Whether or not the historical agents had any choice in 
hri nging about the event, the historian has none. Even when the historian con· 
eludes that an event was not inevitable for the people concerned in ii, it remains 
inevitable for him. He may recognize other possibilitfos for the agent; he himself 
ha<i none. Events are rc1rospec1ively inevitable. 
I should likt: to suggest 1hat. in general, even if the logic of inevitability were in a 
heller state than it apparently is. no such logic could be applied to history without 
adjustment to account for lime. Thus even if we move from the lim&ted notions of 
ine"itability which we have just been discussing to the relationship between the 
historian and the historical process which is Beardsley's context, we should 
recognize that when historians characterize an event as inevitable, they generally 
do so as a projection from a whole series of events which create a momentum in a 
certain direction and a whole set of limiting conditions confining it there. Whether 
\uch at1ribution of inevitability is valid is for the philosophers to tell us, and they 
wi ll ha' e IC' tell us in a way tha1 checks on our use of historical time before we can 
thank them for more than arousing in us the most general kind of awareness that we 
are not exempt from the requirements of reason. 
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